A Two-Stage Matching Game and Repeated Auctions for Users Admission and Channels Allocation in 5G HetNets

Abstract

The fifth-generation (5G) wireless cellular networks aim to increase the users’ capacities and quality of experience as well as to integrate different wireless bands and modes of access. The introduction of cognitive radio technology and heterogeneous networks (HetNets) as part of the architecture of the 5G aims to efficiently reuse the available spectrum. This paper presents a two-stage framework based on matching theory and auction games with the objective of efficiently admitting secondary users to the wireless scene. In the first stage, a fast convergence matching game for the users admission problem in 5G HetNets is considered, where secondary users are associated to appropriate secondary base stations. These base stations access the available primary spectrum on behalf of its associated users in the next stage, namely a repeated modified English auction. Results show the existence of a stable matching point for the users admission game and a Walrasian equilibrium point for the repeated auctions. In addition, extensive simulations are performed to compare the proposed repeated auction against the single auction and the matching theory. It is proven that the repeated auction game outperforms the single auction game and matching game in terms of the occupancy of primary channels and the satisfaction of the secondary users.