A Two-Level Hierarchical Graph Model for Conflict Resolution with Application to International Climate Change Negotiations

Abstract

A novel two-level hierarchical graph model is developed to analyze international climate change negotiations with hierarchical structures: the negotiations take place between two nations and between each nation and its provincial governments. The two national government are two decision makers at the top level. Within each nation, the two provincial governments negotiate with the national government at the lower level. The theoretical structure of this novel model, including decision makers, options, moves, and preference relations, are developed. The interrelationship between the stabilities in the two-level hierarchical graph model and the stabilities in local models are investigated by theorems. These theorems can be utilized to calculate complete stabilities in the two-level hierarchical graph model when the stabilities in local graph models are known. The international climate change negotiations as the illustrative example is then investigated in detail. The extra equilibrium, uniquely obtained by this novel methodology, suggests that opposition may still be from one provincial government when the national government does not sign the international climate agreement and implements existing environmental laws. Compared with other approaches, this novel methodology is an effective and flexible tool in analyzing hierarchical conflicts at two levels by providing decision makers with strategic resolutions with broader vision.