A tutela do voto: clientelismo, chaguismo e outros dilemas da política no Rio de Janeiro

Abstract

This article aims to discuss the subject of the guardianship of the vote. Our aim is to use a structured exploratory methodology based on an analysis of cases located in the state of Rio de Janeiro to discuss several mechanisms allowing Brazilian democracy to be directed within these parameters, within a historical dynamic featuring the relativization or kidnapping of citizen autonomy. First, we raise the question of guardianship based on the concepts of clientelism, mandonismo [bossism], and Chaguism, before providing a typology of candidates useful in a reflection on the profiles to be henceforth considered as representative of Rio’s political elite. In the second part of the text, we outline the particular structural features we understand as the particular pathos of Rio de Janeiro state politics, by means of analyzing two cases. First, that of smuggler Toninho Turco, which provides a useful illustration of the clash between the public machine and organized crime in the state. Second, the mayor of Duque de Caxias, Washington Reis (MDB), appears as a synthesis of the two archetypes of political elite revealed in the state of Rio de Janeiro. This reflection results in an effort to contest the theory of scarcity of supply, or, in other words, that the crisis in the state stems from a lack of electoral alternatives. Finally, we analyze the guardianship by means of the connection between the Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary Powers, as well as the connection between such authorities and organized crime, using the concept of Litigância Militante [militant litigation] to reflect on the search and seizure operations carried out by the Public Ministry in an election year, with a focus on the city of Rio de Janeiro.