A Truthful QoS-Aware Spectrum Auction with Spatial Reuse for Large-Scale Networks

Abstract

In cognitive radio networks (CRNs), a wireless user with primary access right on a channel (called primary user) has prioritized access to the channel and the user with secondary access right (called secondary user) can use the channel when the primary user is idle. Spectrum auction has emerged as a promising approach to address the access allocation problem in CRNs. A significant challenge in designing such auction is providing truthfulness to avoid market manipulation. In most previous work, the primary access rights on channels are pre-determined before the auction and bidders can only compete for the secondary access rights. However, a user's requirement on spectrum access rights relies on their QoS demands. Therefore, it is much desirable to allocate spectrum access rights on the basis of QoS demands as well as to exploit the resulting spatial spectrum reuse opportunities. To solve this problem, we propose TRUMP, a truthful spectrum auction mechanism, by taking into consideration both QoS demands and spectrum spatial reuse, which can drastically improve spectrum utilization. The theoretical analysis proves that TRUMP achieves truthfulness and individual rationality with polynomial-time complexity. Our extensive simulation results show that our proposals outperform previous work in terms of both social welfare and spectrum utilization.