Abstract
To explore the electronic warehouse receipt pledge financing cooperation mechanism in the alliance formed between loan enterprises, commercial banks, e-commerce platforms, and logistics enterprises, by constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model, the game equilibrium strategy is then obtained, and the influencing factors of the cooperation mechanism are further simulated. It was found that in this tripartite evolutionary game, the stable strategy combination occurs when the loan enterprise chooses to repay on time, the platform alliance chooses to provide services, and the commercial bank chooses to continue to cooperate. However, heterogeneity exists in the influencing factors for the three-party selection strategy in the game, which is manifested in the fact that the higher the realization rate of the pledge, the more evolution is required in the selection strategy for loan enterprises to continue cooperating. The higher the information service fee, the higher the enthusiasm of the platform alliance in choosing to provide services. Credit levels, loan interest rates, and pledge realization rates are all important factors that affect the choice strategy of commercial banks.
Highlights
Many scholars have begun to study the related theories for e-commerce supply chain financing, and the recent related research mainly focuses on the financing model for e-commerce supply chains [1, 2], credit guarantee and evaluation issues [3, 4], risk management and control issues [5,6,7], behavioral decision-making issues [8], and cooperation mechanisms [9, 10]
To answer the question of how to stimulate the cooperation enthusiasm of loan enterprise E, platform alliance U, and commercial bank B and achieve a win-win situation among the three parties, it is necessary to analyze the influencing factors on the selection strategy of the three parties. e analysis of evolutionary stability strategy is based on certain constraints, such as λ1≻λ2≻λ3≻λ4, r1≺r≺r2≺β, K≻C and ε≻λiα + r + r1
Changing the constraints may have an impact on the evolution of the system. erefore, MATLAB R2018 B numerical simulation was used to analyze the impact of credit level, loan interest rate (r), information service fee (K), and pledge realization rate (ε) on the evolutionary stability of the system
Summary
Many scholars have begun to study the related theories for e-commerce supply chain financing, and the recent related research mainly focuses on the financing model for e-commerce supply chains [1, 2], credit guarantee and evaluation issues [3, 4], risk management and control issues [5,6,7], behavioral decision-making issues [8], and cooperation mechanisms [9, 10]. If the future credit level of loan enterprise E remains within the acceptable range for commercial bank B, they will not change their original strategy and will choose to continue with the cooperation strategy. The strategies of loan enterprise E are timely repayment and overdue default, while platform alliance U can provide services or deny services, and commercial bank B can continue or suspend cooperation.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
