A Tripartite Evolutionary Game on Promoting the Development of Nearly-Zero Energy Consumption Buildings in China

Abstract

Nearly zero-energy-consumption buildings are the inevitable trend of future buildings. There have been a large number of studies on nearly zero building technology issues. However, there is no detailed study on how to effectively promote the development of nearly zero-energy consumption buildings according to China’s national conditions. Here, by establishing an evolutionary game model, this paper discusses the dynamic game scheme selection and stability strategy of three stakeholders, namely local government, real estate companies, and construction consumers, related to the development of nearly zero-energy-consumption buildings in the development process. The conditions required for evolutionary stabilization strategies were identified. Finally, Matlab data simulation analysis is used to further illustrate the stability and equilibrium strategies of each subject and the sensitivity analysis of the main influencing factors at various stages in the development process of nearly zero-energy-consuming buildings. The research results show that the government plays a leading role in the early stage of the development of nearly zero-energy consumption buildings, and as the market matures, government intervention gradually withdraws from the market; furthermore, if the cost of supervision is prohibitively high, the government’s willingness to supervise the market will be reduced. This will hinder consumers and developers from choosing nearly zero-energy-consuming buildings and if the penalties and subsidies are too low, it will be meaningless to the evolution of the optimal solution of the three parties. On this basis, targeted promotion programs are established to realize the rapid development of China’s nearly zero-energy-consumption building sector. Our research results can provide important scientific basis for the development of the nearly zero-energy building industry in China.