A tripartite evolutionary game model for the hydrogen fuel cell vehicle industry development under government regulation in China

Abstract

The development of the hydrogen fuel cell vehicle (HFCV) industry constitutes a necessary advancement in the transformation and upgrading of the automotive industry as a whole and is also an important strategic route to help China achieve the objectives of carbon neutrality. How to effectively promote the production of HFCV enterprises and the purchase of HFCVs by consumers has become a critical problem that needs to be solved. Taking into consideration the limited rationality of the government, enterprises and consumers, we applied a tripartite evolutionary game theory (EGT) model to analyze the impact of government regulation on the development of the HFCV industry. The simulation results show that: (1) medium-intensity supervision can promote robust and regulated HFCV industry development; (2) the higher the penalty, the more likely enterprises are to transition to HFCV production; (3) the larger the research and development (R&D) subsidy, the more beneficial it is for enterprises to overcome technical obstacles; (4) higher investment in infrastructure stimulates consumers to purchase HFCVs. Based on these results, some recommendations have provided to support the sustainable development of HFCV industry in China.