Abstract
The construction and development of international transport corridors have become a means of cross-border space governance and promote the flexibility of international industrial chains and supply chains. Due to the uncertainty of cooperation, the development of international transport corridors entails a long-term and complex system of engineering. This paper evaluates a tripartite evolutionary game model on the cooperative construction of international transport corridors (including origin, transit, and destination countries) and analyzes the cooperation mechanism and influencing factors. The cooperative construction of international transport corridors is complex. Factors such as willingness to cooperate, transfer payments, sunk costs, and reputation have a positive impact on the cooperative construction of international transport corridors, but excessive transfer payments hinder cooperation. To promote the construction of international transport corridors, all parties need to have a strong willingness to cooperate; otherwise, the cooperation agreement has a greater probability of becoming invalid. International transport corridors with good development prospects and benefits would accelerate construction progress with the active efforts of participating countries.
Highlights
An international transport corridor connects logistics hubs that are located in different countries through one or more modes of transport and enables the interconnection of economies located in different geographical spaces [1, 2]
International transport corridors are developed based on two main goals: (1) to increase the efficiency of the corridor’s transportation and logistics processes in order to improve connectivity and transportation networks and (2) to promote economic development in areas along the corridor [6,7,8]. us, the transport corridor development strategy is a widely adopted practice to narrow regional development gaps [9, 10]
The researcher assumes that participating countries of a certain planned international corridor are three bounded and rational game parties, divided into the origin country (N1), the destination country (N2), and the transit country (N3). e spatial relationship between them is shown in Figure 1. e participating countries of the international corridor are assumed heterogeneous. e origin and destination country are global or regional powers with relatively high levels of development. ere is strong motivation for the interconnection between them, for example, to reduce international trade logistics costs, to improve the accessibility of border areas, and to increase international influence
Summary
An international transport corridor connects logistics hubs that are located in different countries through one or more modes of transport and enables the interconnection of economies located in different geographical spaces [1, 2]. E construction and operation of an international transport corridor is a complex systematic project with many influencing factors and numerous relationships that require coordination. Co-construction of international transport corridors requires the participation and cooperation of countries along the route. Improving the efficiency of an international transport corridor is a long-term, complex, and systematic project, often involving repetition in construction, unforeseen problems, hesitation to remain involved, negotiation, dishonesty, or progress disruption among countries along the route. Some scholars have used evolutionary game theory to construct a game model of two decision-making subjects to analyze the construction of international transport corridors [27], while others have incorporated project partners and the public of the host country into the analysis to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model [28]. Some scholars have used evolutionary game theory to construct a game model of two decision-making subjects to analyze the construction of international transport corridors [27], while others have incorporated project partners and the public of the host country into the analysis to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model [28]. is paper uses evolutionary game theory to construct a dynamic evolutionary game model to investigate the mechanism for the cooperation and co-construction of international transport corridors
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