A Transferable Load Management Contract Model Based on Mechanism Design Theory

Abstract

in the electricity market environment, the information asymmetry between power grid companies and users may lead to the inefficient planning and implementation of demand response (DR) projects. Therefore, this paper proposes a transferable load management contract model based on mechanism design theory to improve the flexibility and operability of users with transferable load to participate in day-ahead scheduling of power system. In this model, the user type parameter is introduced to describe the user's willingness to participate in the transferable load management contract, the rational behavior of the user participating in the contract transaction is reflected by the personal rational constraint, and the incentive compatibility constraint is used to urge the user to report the real type parameter in the transaction process. Under this mechanism, according to the type of users reported by the users, the power grid company uses the incentive mechanism to encourage users to actively participate in load transfer, and restricts the response behavior of users through the form of contract, which can reduce the uncertainty of the implementation of demand response and improve the economy and environmental protection of the power grid operation. In this paper, through the analysis of a numerical example, it is verified that the mechanism can effectively stimulate the potential of user transfer load, realize the optimal allocation of transferable load, which is beneficial to reduce the economic cost of the system, reduce carbon emissions, and improve the overall social benefits.