A Traitor-Resistant and Dynamic Anonymous Communication Service for Cloud-Based VANETs

Abstract

Cloud-based VANETs are designed to enable communication between high-speed vehicles. In such a highly dynamic environment, how to provide secure and anonymous communication service is a challenge. In this article, we affirmatively address the challenge by proposing a traitor-resistant and dynamic anonymous communication framework (TD-ACF) for cloud-based VANETs, which supports several advantageous features. In TD-ACF, each vehicle is represented by a set of attributes instead of its real identity, and the driving data is transmitted in encrypted form. Therefore, the anonymous authentication and the confidentiality of driving data are achieved in this way. Meanwhile, TD-ACF supports two practical requirements in cloud-based VANETs: the revocation and the traceability of traitor. For the former, TD-ACF can force a vehicle to exit the communication network at any moment. We employ an efficient binary tree algorithm to reduce the size of key updates for revocation from the traditional linear to the logarithmic level. For the latter, we overcome the barrier of the one-to-many relationship between a vehicle and the shared set of attributes to support traitor tracing. In TD-ACF, unlike most existing schemes, the Semi-Trusted Cloud (STC) can directly capture and punish a traitor instead of querying all the records in the list of unrevoked vehicles. In addition, we solve the key escrow problem that plagues most existing attribute-based schemes. The theoretical analysis and experimental simulation show that the proposed scheme is feasible and effective.