A Theory of State Strategies under Global Rules

Abstract

This chapter shows the theoretical framework of the book, beginning by outlining the three competing state strategies through which different government actors can respond to World Trade Organization (WTO) entry. To introduce the theory, the chapter disaggregates China's sprawling party-state into the relevant actors influencing economic policy and explicates the fragmented structure of policymaking within which these actors operate. After discussing the economic and institutional channels through which WTO entry alters the interests of different political-bureaucratic actors, the chapter introduces the range of strategic options available to these actors in responding to WTO entry. The two main variables driving an actor's strategy choice are the unevenly distributed likelihood of being sanctioned for deviating from WTO rules and the varying prospects for political advancement. Ultimately, the chapter systematizes these dynamics with a set of hypotheses predicting how an actor's choice of strategic response to WTO entry varies across administrative levels, within the central government, and across industries.