A theory of singular causal explanation

Abstract

I call such sentences "explanations" deliberately, for it is one of my cen? tral claims that we may legitimately think of them as constituting, in ap? propriate contexts, explanations of why the fire occurred or of why the chestnut shattered. In this essay I shall be interested in the structure and explanatory import of such sentences in what they tell us and why it is that we are entitled to take them as explanatory. The position I shall de? fend is in many respects the mirror image of the most commonly accept? ed philosophical view of singular causal explanations. The commonly ac? cepted view1 is that there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between singular causal explanations and those sentences (call them singular causal sentences) which simply report causal connections. While singular causal sentences are said to typically relate events, and to be extensional, sin? gular causal explanations are held to relate items which are sentential or factlike in structure and to be non-extensional. Singular causal explana? tions are held on this view to always be explanations of why events or other objects belong to certain kinds or possess certain properties. According to the view I shall defend, singular causal sentences and sin? gular causal explanations do not differ fundamentally in structure in this way. A singular explanation will simply consist of a sentence which re? ports a causal connection like (1) or (2) above. Singular causal explana? tions are extensional on both the cause-side and the effect-side and (sub? ject to various qualifications and refinements to be introduced below) many such explanations relate terms which are event-like rather than fact? like in structure. Many singular causal explanations are not explanations of why events or other particulars possess certain properties, but are rather, as we shall see, something quite different explanations of the occurrence of individual events.2