Abstract
Consumption externalities are frequently cited as a justification for in-kind transfers. In the presence of consumption externalities, in-kind transfers may achieve a Pareto optimal allocation. This paper argues that actual in-kind transfers do not achieve a Pareto optimum, but instead tend to produce a paternalistic optimum which caters to the preferences of taxpayers (donors) and ignores the preferences of recipients.
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