A Theory of Compellence with Nuclear Latency

Abstract

Abstract Chapter 2 presents a new theory of compellence with nuclear latency. The core finding is that states need just enough bomb-making potential to make both proliferation threats and promises of nuclear restraint credible. The chapter presents this theory in five parts. The first explores the dilemma challengers face between making proliferation threats and nonproliferation assurances credible. The second part presents hypotheses about when this strategy is likely to succeed or fail as the challenger marches toward the bomb. This logic reveals a sweet spot amount of latency where compellence should be most likely to work because challengers can underwrite both threats and assurances. The third part compares these claims to alternative explanations. The fourth part grounds the boundaries of the sweet spot in actual nuclear technology. The final part of the chapter formulates a research strategy and selects cases to evaluate the theory.