‘A THEORY FOR ALL MUSIC’

Abstract

Jay Rahn's indignant, and largely undignified, attack on my review of his book A Theory for All Music (see Music & Letters, lvii (1986), 68-71, & lviii (1987), 106-8) does little to counter the criticisms levelled at the basic assumptions underlying his theory or at the workings of the theory itself. Instead, Rahn seizes on short passages from the review and, with an alarming combination of sophistry and pedantry, endeavours to demonstrate what he alleges to be my bold misrepresentation of the entire work. Only one point in my review requires any kind of clarification. It is not the 'criteria' by which Rahn evaluates the potential 'bases' for the development of 'a theory for all music' that I find doubtful. Apart from favouring Popper's 'falsifiability' over Ayer's 'verifiability', I agree with Rahn's choice of economy and range of applicability as criteria whereby the different bases might be judged. What I do find doubtful, as exemplified in the third paragraph of my review, are the arguments which Rahn invokes to demonstrate how existing ethnomusicological approaches do not fulfil these criteria. Rahn also makes much of my description of existing ethnomusicological approaches as 'summarily dismissed' by him, claiming that what he describes as 'sixteen densely written and closely reasoned pages' cannot be characterized thus. Apart from the fallacy of much of Rahn's reasoning, it should be noted that he contrives in those sixteen pages to dismiss the major insights of the leading ethnomusicologists of the more recent past (Merriam, Feld, Blacking, Seeger, Nettl, Herndon, List) as 'defective' for a theory for all music. In my discussion of Rahn's dismissal of various bases for his theory, I referred to the fact that he rejects a cultural perspective. His denial that he does so is mystifying. In the relevant section of the book he states, with regard to cultural data, that 'they cannot be considered necessary for an interpretation, because cultural values have been demonstrated to determine only a small, and relatively superficial portion of the musical observables in any given instance' (p. 19). Indeed, in his response to my review, Rahn asserts his belief that he has 'demolished the existing and somewhat uncompelling arguments and findings that have been advanced' in support of the view that cultural data are necessary to the study of a musical system. The main thrust of Chapter 10 ('Cultural Correlates'), which Rahn charges me with not having read, is to explain away John Blacking's attempts to demonstrate precisely the way in which cultural data are integral to the study of the Venda musical system. While Rahn believes that 'one can go a long way towards correlating the observables [i.e. the musical sound] with their immediate cultural context' (p. 217), he apparently rejects the existence of a causal relationship between the two. In similar vein, Rahn professes, in his response to my review, to reject the ability of factors external to the musical sound to inform our understanding of the musical product but not of musical processes. Inasmuch as the musical sound is shaped by its cultural context or the musical product results from musical processes, Rahn's views are nothing if not illogical. Rahn fails to grasp the basis of my objection to his use of the term 'observables' to refer to the musical sound. My reasons for regarding this as 'not just a semantic quibble' are stated in the fifth paragraph of my review. On the general question of aural perception, I make no apology for 'neglecting' Chapter 9 ('Perceptual Correlates') of Rahn's book. Given that he treats the transcriptions that he subjects to analysis as having an objective reality equal in status to the sound itself, without consideration of the technical matters concerning the psychology of perception outlined in Chapter 9, the latter functions largely as an academic exercise. Rahn's inability to distinguish between the musical sound and the visual representation of the musical sound ultimately makes for chaos and confusion. For example, his view of an adequate analysis as one which is 'consistent with the observables; that is, it never contradicts them' (p. 121) ignores the fact that an analysis can only be judged in terms of the sounds represented by a given transcription. If one accepts Rahn's 'subtle' view that the musical sound can be transcribed in any number of ways depending on one's theoretical basis for doing so, and that each transcription embodies a single analysis, then that analysis will perforce be consistent with the 'observables' as shown in the transcription. It is not clear on what basis he chooses between one transcription and analysis and another. If the decision rests on prior knowledge of a culture's music (as it