Abstract
The introduction and analysis of a simple idealized model enables basic insights into how military characteristics and recruitment strategies affect the dynamics of armed conflicts, even in the complex case of three or more fighting groups. In particular, the model shows when never ending wars (stalemates) are possible and how initial conditions and interventions influence a conflict's fate. The analysis points out that defensive recruitment policies aimed at compensating for suffered losses lead to conflicts with simple dynamics, while attack groups sensitive to the damages they inflict onto their enemies can give rise to conflicts with turbulent behaviours. Since non-governmental groups often follow attack strategies, the conclusion is that the evolution of conflicts involving groups of that kind can be expected to be difficult to forecast.
Highlights
The interest in mathematical models of armed conflicts has increased in the last decades [1–4] owing to the wide prevalence and complex nature of such conflicts
We have derived general properties of the time evolution of complex armed conflicts without referring to historical observations, but starting, instead, from simple conjectures on the ideal behaviors of the groups involved in the conflict
Each group follows a particular recruitment policy and is endowed with specific military characteristics that determine the damages inflicted to the enemies
Summary
Peer Review History: PLOS recognizes the benefits of transparency in the peer review process; we enable the publication of all of the content of peer review and author responses alongside final, published articles. Data Availability Statement: All relevant data are within the manuscript.
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