Abstract
This paper provides an empirical framework to test three competing theories regarding the behavior of public executives in the local public sector. These alternative theo- ries are the public interest, median-voter and expense preference (or surplus-maximizing Leviathan) models. This study tests these various theories by determining whether aggregate property values, the median-value of housing or administra- tive expenditures is a more significant determinant of the salary of a representative school executive in Connecticut. The empirical results lend some support for the expense preference model (Leviathan model) of public executive be- havior.
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