A terrorism-based differential game: Nash differential game

Abd El-Monem A Megahed

doi:10.1186/s13662-021-03635-y

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the problem of combating terrorism by the government, which is one of the most serious problems that direct governments and countries. We formulate the problem and use the Nash approach of a differential game to obtain the optimal strategies for combating terrorism. We study the relationship between each of the government’ strategies and terrorism when the government is on the defensive (reactive), and we study when the government expects terrorist attacks and develops its strategies to combat terrorism. Also, we study the relationship between government activity and its strategies as well as government activity and the strategy of terrorist organizations.

Highlights

Terrorism is defined as the deliberate use of indiscriminate violence in order to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives
The Nash differential game plays a critical role in the fight against terrorism
4 Conclusions We studied the problem of combating terrorism, so we formulated the problem and used the Nash approach of a differential game for obtaining the optimal strategies for combating terrorism, and we obtained several relationships, which are the relationship between the strategies of the government and terrorist organizations when the government is in a state of reaction and vice versa

Summary

Introduction

Terrorism is defined as the deliberate use of indiscriminate violence in order to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives. We analyze the interaction strategies between the government and terrorist organizations using a differential game technique. The government incurs costs in countering terrorism in addition to limiting terrorist resources and activity.

Results

Conclusion