A teorija vremena i početak svemira

Abstract

The question about the beginning of the universe is crucial in philosophy in view of certain cosmological arguments for God’s existence (notably the Kalām cosmological argument), but it is also interesting in itself. This article defends the position that an interpretation of the beginning of the universe in terms of A–theoretical ontology is justified, as opposed to the B–theory. The two strongest objections to the A–theory are the problems of veracity of arguments on past and future events and the incompatibility of the A–theory with the Special Theory of Relativity. We argue that the first objection is resolved upon the A–theorist’s finding a suitable subject for the instantiation of temporal properties. As for the second objection, it is not true that the A–theory is incompatible with the Special Theory of Relativity simpliciter: it is only incompatible with Minkowski’s interpretation. We propose a few steps towards avoiding this interpretation.