A Ten-Year Overview of USAF F-16 Mishap Attributes from 1980–89

Abstract

The F-16 Falcon jet fighter is a marvel of engineering. Having been in operational United States Air Force service since approximately 1980, this fly-by-wire aircraft can climb vertically, sustain a 9-G turn without the loss of airspeed, and fly greater than the speed of sound. With such capabilities, this aircraft was originally designed and conceived of as a daylight air-to-air “dog-fighting” pilot's dream. As time has passed, the F-16 aircraft has been tasked with carrying out much more diverse missions than only day air-to-air combat. The aircraft and highly-trained pilots that fly it now accomplish additional missions such as day and night ground attack. An examination of ten years of USAF Safety Center accident data revealed that the F-16 aircraft had 59 Class A operational mishaps during this period. This was the highest number for any single-seat fighter-attack aircraft, and second only to the Aggressor's “Red Flag” F-5 per 100,000 hours of flight time (Class A Accident Rates: F-16 2.86 v. F-5 4.76). Incidentally, about 73% of the Royal Netherlands Air Force pilots reported that they were more susceptible to spatial disorientation and loss of situation awareness in the F-16 compared to other fighter aircraft that they had flown. After 11 years of operational experience, 21 of 210 of the Netherlands' F-16 aircraft were destroyed. A detailed examination of the USAF database revealed that a host of human factors issues are pertinent to the F-16 such as the loss of situation awareness, spatial disorientation, G-induced loss of consciousness, etc.; all of which contributed heavily to the accident rates cited for this aircraft. Additionally, cockpit design issues relatable to man-machine interfacing present human factors challenges to the pilot as well depending upon the mission scenario. The majority (53%) of F-16 accidents occurred during low-level or maneuvering flight. About 20% of the F-16 mishaps happened during the takeoff or landing phase of operations. Over 60% of the accidents were deemed by investigating officers to have “channelized attention” as a definite contributor to the mishap rate. Other human factors issues such as task oversaturation, distraction, and a variety of spatial disorientation problems contributed to many of the accidents also. Cockpit improvements, research, better training/awareness programs and Ground Collision Avoidance Devices (GCAS/PARS) are all suggested as methods to reduce future F-16 Falcon accident rates.