A Tale of Two Nozicks: Democracy as the Death Knell of Nozick’s Libertarianism

Abstract

This paper argues that Robert Nozick’s rejection of libertarianism, based on the existence of democratic institutions, is incomplete. This is because various schemes of property distribution, including those with strong rights to property, may be consistent with democracy. Accordingly, if Nozick is to properly reject libertarianism, he must do so on other grounds.Part I argues that allowing a minimal amount of democracy leads to expansionary pressures in the size of the minimal state.Part II assesses Nozick’s assertion that democratic institutions mandate the rejection of libertarian property rights but concludes that property rights may coexist with democracy. In addition, it is argued Nozick’s endorsement of a zigzag process of democratic politics may go too far by potentially sanctioning excessive interference in people’s lives.Part III argues that attempts to equate various schemes of economic distribution with the proper form of democracy are doomed to endless disputation because such claims are essentially contested. The concluding section briefly discusses the paradoxical way whereby skepticism provides compelling arguments both for and against the minimal state and the more than minimal state.