Abstract
Economic efficiency in social dilemma experiments can be increased by allowing for one-shot peer-to-peer sanctions or rewards. In case of sanctions the efficiency gain disappears if the experiment design allows for retaliation, or ‘reciprocity in punishment’. We examine whether efficiency increases or decreases when allowing for reciprocity in rewarding. We find that allowing for reciprocity in rewards increases the number of reward tokens exchanged but at the cost of reduced efficiency in the social dilemma situation.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
