Abstract
Job rotation is an important tool in public administration that is used to enhance learning and diversify experience among employees, while reducing opportunities for rent‐seeking behaviour. The benefits of job rotation, however, may be reduced if carried out too frequently or for narrow partisan reasons. Frequent transfers and postings in a civil service characterized by life‐long contracts negatively impact on‐the‐job learning, accountability for results, and incentives to acquire skills. This study examines the political and internal civil service determinants of frequent transfers in the civil service of Punjab, Pakistan. We employ Poisson panel estimations for 338 job positions for elite management cadres in Pakistan over a five‐year period from 2006 to 2010. The analysis shows that a change in elected government and desirability of a position increase the frequency of transfers.
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