A switching approach to event-triggered control systems under denial-of-service attacks

Abstract

This paper addresses the resilient event-triggered control (ETC) of networked control systems under denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. The scenario in which the presence of DoS attacks limits the data rate is studied considering a deterministic DoS attack model that constrains the frequency and duration of the DoS attack sequence in an average sense. Based on a switching approach, constructive sufficient conditions are proposed to design the resilient ETC scheme in both emulation and co-design approaches. The conditions establish a limitation to the average DoS frequency and duration such that the exponential stability of the closed-loop equilibrium and the Zeno-freeness is guaranteed even in the presence of DoS attacks. Moreover, optimization problems subject to LMI constraints are formulated to solve the emulation and co-design problems by enlarging the resilience to the considered class of DoS attacks while the number of transmissions is reduced. This establishes a clear trade-off between resilience and resource awareness in networked control systems under DoS attacks. The effectiveness of the proposed conditions is illustrated in two numerical examples.