Abstract

Major public institutions and organizations that handle sensitive data frequently enforce strong security policies by implementing network separation policies that segregates their internal work networks and internet network using air gaps to prevent the leakage of confidential information. Such closed networks have long been considered the most secure technique for protecting data; however, studies have shown that they are no longer effective in providing a safe data protection environment. Research on air-gap attacks remains in its infancy stage. Studies have been conducted to check the method and demonstrate the possibility of transmitting data using various transmission media available within the closed network. These transmission media include optical signals such as HDD LEDs, acoustic signals such as speakers, and the electrical signals of power lines. This paper examines various media used for air-gap attacks by analyzing different techniques and their essential functions, strengths, and limitations. The findings of this survey and the follow-up analysis aim to assist companies and organizations in protecting their information by providing an understanding of air-gap attacks and their current trends.

Full Text
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