Abstract
In part I of this article [1], we described developments in mathematical logic before 1931. Gödel’s famous paper On formally undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and related systems, was published in January of that year. In it Gödel established two theorems:(1)Incompleteness: For any consistent theory at least as strong as arithmetic there are sentences which can neither be proved nor disproved in the theory.(2)Unprovability of consistency: The consistency of such a theory cannot be proved within the theory.We are going to outline, with minor adjustments to notation, Gödel’s actual proof of (1) given, in translation, in [2, pp. 5–38].
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