A Sufficiently Just Liberal Society is an Illusion

Lea Ypi

doi:10.1007/s11158-019-09441-4

Abstract

Matteo Bonotti’s book on Partisanship and Public Reason in Diverse Societies is grounded on a theory of partisanship that sees the demands of public reason as internal to the very definition of a party. Bonotti suggests that partisanship is not only compatible with but essential to the stability and legitimacy of a well-ordered liberal society. My paper aims to raise some questions internal to the liberal account of partisanship so as to probe the methodological foundations and plausibility of the liberal framework taken as a whole. My argument is that the assumption of a sufficiently just liberal society on which the book grounds its defence of partisanship makes us ill-equipped to face some of the most critical challenges that liberal societies face in the world that we live.

Highlights

Partisanship and Political Liberalism in Diverse Societies is a distinctive and welcome contribution to the growing literature on the normative relevance of political parties for contemporary democratic theory and practice
Grounded on a theory of partisanship that sees the demands of public reason as internal to the very definition of a party, Bonotti suggests that partisanship is compatible with but essential to the stability and legitimacy of a well-ordered liberal society
My aim is to raise some questions internal to the liberal account of partisanship so as to probe the methodological foundations and plausibility of the liberal framework taken as a whole

Summary

Public Reason and Intermediary Associations

Partisanship and Political Liberalism in Diverse Societies is a distinctive and welcome contribution to the growing literature on the normative relevance of political parties (and partisanship) for contemporary democratic theory and practice. Like other institutions of the state, they translate such interests and principles into political platforms, electoral proposals and eventually government policies and laws Such laws and policies are coercively imposed on the rest of the citizenry and require public justification in terms that everyone can share. To see why public reason does not extrinsically constrain partisanship but is enabled by it, we need to reflect on the intermediary nature of political parties as associations grounded both in civil society and in the state It is precisely in virtue of their intermediary nature, Bonotti argues, that parties are in the best position to articulate their demands as demands of public reason and to promote the overlapping consent that is necessary to the legitimacy and stability of a liberal society.

The Ideal and Reality of Partisanship in Liberal Societies

Liberal Societies

Political Liberalism and Overlapping Consensus

Partisanship and Political Obligations

Conclusion