A Subjectivist Reply to Swinburne

Abstract

A philosophical tradition is in part identified by its more durable controversies. The British tradition in moral philosophy running, roughly, from Hobbes to the present day, involves several fine examples of the type—the plausibility or otherwise of the compatibilist view of free will, the case for and against utilitarianism, and perhaps above all the implications of the fact/value distinction. It is always pleasing to find some new variation on such themes; you have a comforting sense of the inherent permanence of this corner of the intellectual universe. Thus R. G. Swinburne's paper ‘The Objectivity of Morality’ (Philosophy, January 1976) is much to be welcomed as a contribution to a well-matured debate. Even more, perhaps, it is welcome on account of its considerable clarity. But clarity often comes at a high price, and the price in this case is too high. By setting out his version of the objectivist position with such precision and lack of ambiguity Professor Swinburne has made its difficulties and weaknesses accessible to all but the meanest intellect.