Abstract
In this work, by using the Nash-collative approach for a differential game problem between N -governments and terrorist organizations, we study governments’ cooperation and the role of each government for counterterrorism. Furthermore, we discuss the intertemporal strategic interaction of governments and terrorist organizations, where all world governments have to cooperate to fight terrorism. Also, we study the necessary conditions for finding the optimal strategies for each government to fight terrorism; we discuss the existence of the solution of the formulated problem and the stability set of the first kind of the optimal strategies.
Highlights
It is clear that the world suffers from many serious problems, and the problem of terrorism is one of the most important and serious problems suffered by the local and international communities throughout the ages, especially in recent times
A min–max approach of a differential game was discussed to get the optimal solution of the government and the terror organization by Megahed [12,13,14]. He studied two problems of governments’ visions and terrorist organization and proved that governmental activities are important for fighting terrorism and discussed the Stackelberg differential game with E-differentiable function and Econvex set
In [15], Wrzaczek et al discussed models of differential terror queue games, as terrorist organizations seek to increase the rates of attacks over time, but at the same time, the government is developing its antiterror activities; in [16], Megahed introduced the Stackelberg approach for counterterrorism
Summary
It is clear that the world suffers from many serious problems, and the problem of terrorism is one of the most important and serious problems suffered by the local and international communities throughout the ages, especially in recent times. A min–max approach of a differential game was discussed to get the optimal solution of the government and the terror organization by Megahed [12,13,14] He studied two problems of governments’ visions and terrorist organization and proved that governmental activities are important for fighting terrorism and discussed the Stackelberg differential game with E-differentiable function and Econvex set. In [15], Wrzaczek et al discussed models of differential terror queue games, as terrorist organizations seek to increase the rates of attacks over time, but at the same time, the government is developing its antiterror activities; in [16], Megahed introduced the Stackelberg approach for counterterrorism
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