Abstract
An objective of this paper is to study how agents in citation auctions behave in terms of their strategies as well as how their perceptions of the Internal Private Values (IPVs) impacts those strategies. These issues are studied using several auction mechanisms, such as the Second Price Sealed Bid (SPSB) auction, the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA), and the Uniform Price Sealed Bid (UPSB) auction. Using experiments, each auction mechanism is analyzed and its performance in citation auction measured to find their fitness for citation auctions. The results show that optimistic agents perform well in balanced populations of scholar agents biding in a single market. It is also studied how scholar agents decide in which market to bid, given the competing population of scholars with agents in multiple markets. Finally, the need for a global recommender to help agents to decide how to behave when participating in a single market is evaluated.
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