A Study on Collaborative Governance of Tourism Default ---- Analysis Based on Three-way Deductive Evolutionary Game Theory

Abstract

With the opening up of the domestic epidemic and the tourism heatwave, hotel default behaviors have emerged one after another. With the increasing exposure of default issues, the contradictions between tourists and businesses, tourists and the government, and government and businesses have become increasingly prominent, and have once become the focus of social attention. This article fully considers the regulation and supply-demand relationship of stakeholders in the tourism industry in environmental regulations and constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model between the government, businesses, and tourists. It analyzes the strategic evolution paths of each participant and the factors that affect their evolution. The research results indicate that the enthusiasm of government regulation is a key factor in solving the problem of default, and the fluctuations in its behavioral strategies simultaneously affect the behavior of tourists and businesses; Consumer rights protection is another key factor in promoting compliance behavior among businesses; The probability of merchants choosing compliant behavior reaches its maximum when the government and tourists work together; In the process of collaborative governance, the government can effectively suppress the motivation of merchants to adopt default pricing by adopting active regulatory measures such as increasing the amount of punishment and compensation. However, more importantly, it can improve consumers' willingness to protect their rights by reducing the cost of tourists' rights protection and establishing appropriate reward systems, making up for the lack of government regulation.