Abstract
Nzoia river basin county governments barely cooperate in water resources management to jointly increase the basin’s food and energy productivity levels, due to limited trust. In this paper, we propose a game-based approach that can be replicated in any river basin, to assess trust and collaboration processes. In particular, we used the pre-game, in-game, and post-game assessment results to assess the relationship between Cooperation and Competition; Trust and Trustworthiness; Trust and Distrust; and (Dis) trust, Complexity, and Uncertainty. The initial assessment of respondents’ propensity to trust (PTS) was divided into two variables (trust and trustworthiness) while adopting the unidimensional view of trust and distrust. We later examined whether we could separate the two constructs using a multidimensional scaling (MDS) technique known as the ALSCAL procedure. There are potentially significant results. Namely, that: trustworthiness and trust are not complementary; both cooperation and competition coexisted and increased throughout the game; more profound complexity and uncertainty led to an increment in trust, and reduced complexity and uncertainty led to a decrease in distrust. Based on the results and discussions, we provide recommendations for further research on trust, trustworthiness, and distrust in the river basin management context.
Highlights
Studies show an increasing difficulty for countries to make all their food and energy, within national geographical boundaries, due to scarce water resources [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10]
We present the findings on the WeShareIt Game trade exchanges (3.1), the PT sub-scales responses findings based on the Chi-Square goodness-of-fit test (3.2) and the multidimensional scaling (MDS) (3.3)
To be able to tap into the positive aspects of trust, it is imperative that trust concepts and collaborative processes that relate to water resources management are better understood
Summary
Studies show an increasing difficulty for countries to make all their food and energy, within national geographical boundaries, due to scarce water resources [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10]. Basin states are faced with a difficult decision: whether to maximize food and energy production or limit and/or stop production and buy the shortfall from other riparian states [11]. Rational decision-making supports cooperation aimed at maximizing production while minimizing costs, regardless of where the food or energy is produced within the basin [6]. Trust is a critical element needed when making the bold decision to stop or limit production and buy the shortfall from other riparian states [9,10,12]. Many basin states are locked in an impasse: they need to cooperate to build trust, and they cannot cooperate because they lack the ‘willingness to cooperate,’ which is a core element that initiates cooperation [13] Many basin states are locked in an impasse: they need to cooperate to build trust, and they cannot cooperate because they lack the ‘willingness to cooperate,’ which is a core element that initiates cooperation [13] (p. 225)
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