A Study of the Impact of Executive Power and Employee Stock Ownership Plans on Corporate Cost Stickiness: Evidence from China A-Share Non-Financial Listed Companies

Abstract

It is of great value to study the stickiness of enterprise cost for reducing enterprise cost and improving enterprise performance. This paper selected all A-share non-financial listed companies from 2014 to 2019 to study the impact of executive power and employee stock ownership plans on cost stickiness. The study found that the higher the executive power, the stronger the cost stickiness of the enterprise. By reducing the adjustment costs and optimistic expectations of management and improving the performance sensitivity of executive compensation and quality of information disclosure, an employee stock ownership plan plays a role in suppressing the cost-stickiness effect of executive power. The larger the scale and the more times the employee stock ownership plan is implemented, the stronger the inhibition effect is. An employee stock ownership plan has a stronger inhibiting effect on the cost-stickiness effect of executive power in enterprises with a large proportion of state-owned and institutional shares and high employee status. Combining the research themes of management accounting and financial accounting, this study discusses the economic consequences of ESOP from the perspective of enterprise cost control, which is helpful for internal and external stakeholders of enterprises to understand the characteristics and effects of ESOP in the new era, and also provides new evidence for enterprise cost control while enlightening policy makers and listed companies to explore the feasible mechanism of enterprise cost control from the staff level. It is of great value to study the stickiness of enterprise cost for reducing enterprise cost and improving enterprise performance. This paper selected all A-share non-financial listed companies from 2014 to 2019 to study the impact of executive power and an employee stock ownership plan on cost stickiness. It is found that the higher the executive power, the stronger the cost stickiness. An employee stock ownership plan has a stronger inhibiting effect on the cost-stickiness effect of executive power in enterprises with a large proportion of state-owned and institutional shares and high employee status. This study provides new evidence for corporate cost control.