Abstract
The study of stable fractional matchings is fairly recent and moreover, is scarce. This paper reports the first investigation into the important but unexplored topic of incentive compatibility of matching mechanisms to find stable fractional matchings.We focus our attention on matching instances under strict preferences. First, we make the significant observation that there are matching instances for which no mechanism that produces a stable fractional matching is incentive compatible.We then characterize restricted settings of matching instances admitting unique stable fractional matchings. For this class of instances, we prove that every mechanism that produces the unique stable fractional matching is (a) incentive compatible and (b) resistant to coalitional manipulations. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the stable fractional matching as well.
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