Abstract
This paper proposes a route choice analytic method that embeds cumulative prospect theory in evolutionary game theory to analyze how the drivers adjust their route choice behaviors under the influence of the traffic information. A simulated network with two alternative routes and one variable message sign is built to illustrate the analytic method. We assume that the drivers in the transportation system are bounded rational, and the traffic information they receive is incomplete. An evolutionary game model is constructed to describe the evolutionary process of the drivers' route choice decision-making behaviors. Here we conclude that the traffic information plays an important role in the route choice behavior. The driver's route decision-making process develops towards different evolutionary stable states in accordance with different transportation situations. The analysis results also demonstrate that employing cumulative prospect theory and evolutionary game theory to study the driver's route choice behavior is effective. This analytic method provides an academic support and suggestion for the traffic guidance system, and may optimize the travel efficiency to a certain extent.
Highlights
In recent years, with the rapid development of information technology, traffic information system has had a great effect on travel decision-making behavior
The results showed that drivers assumed the travel time of their alternative routes according to the incident information of the road section provided by VMS
From the evolutionary equilibrium analysis (Table 3), (0, 0) is the strictly dominant pure strategy. It suggests that when the travel efficiency losses are small, all the drivers will choose route A, and the transportation system will progress toward the evolutionary stable state that the proportion of T1 and T2 selecting route B is x = 0 and y = 0
Summary
This paper proposes a route choice analytic method that embeds cumulative prospect theory in evolutionary game theory to analyze how the drivers adjust their route choice behaviors under the influence of the traffic information. An evolutionary game model is constructed to describe the evolutionary process of the drivers’ route choice decision-making behaviors. The driver’s route decision-making process develops towards different evolutionary stable states in accordance with different transportation situations. The analysis results demonstrate that employing cumulative prospect theory and evolutionary game theory to study the driver’s route choice behavior is effective. This analytic method provides an academic support and suggestion for the traffic guidance system, and may optimize the travel efficiency to a certain extent
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