A study of authentication protocols for security of mobile RFID (M-RFID) system

Abstract

Radio-frequency identification (RFID) uses electromagnetic fields for wireless communication that automatically recognized target devices with no physical interaction with the purpose of information transmission. The RFID system composed of transponder or tag, interrogator and back-end host system. The services of mobile RFID (M-RFID) networks can be setup by consolidating with current wireless networking for mobile devices and RFID networks whereby these services are aiming for individual and private users using Mobile smart phone or PDA. Even though these systems have the benefits of RFID and mobile technology, it also promotes crucial security and privacy issues. M-RFID inherits all issues that exist in the traditional RFID system, for example, replay attack, denial of service, spoofing, traceability and impersonation. However the severity of these issues intensifies because M-RFID reader is used in the wireless environment with agility in movement and greater scanning zone. Therefore, many security protocols developed to support the security and privacy problems arise in M-RFID systems. Among the famous security protocol for the system is the ultralightweight authentication protocols and this survey focus on the study of these protocols. These protocols are not capable of fulfilling all the security and privacy requirements especially in the mobile wireless environments. As in most of the literatures that described and proposed for the security and privacy authentication protocol of M-RFID, they proved that designing a security and privacy authentication protocol is still a demanding and challenging activities. Although many authentication protocols have been developed over the years, none can be considered as perfect and supreme. Based on the review of the authentication protocols, the well-chosen protocol always depends on the context and scenario for the security and privacy efficiency requirements of the M-RFID system.