Abstract
In trust and reputation systems in pervasive computing,selfish users may maximize their profits by falsely declaring their recommendations strategically.In this paper,we propose a strategy-proof trust mechanism which is a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG) mechanism for honest recommendation elicitation.The proposed mechanism is prompt since the payment will be paid to the recommenders before the outcome of the interaction can be observed.A weighted VCG strategy-proof mechanism based on weighted majority continuous algorithm is proposed to adjust the weights of recommendations.We then give general form of trust based decision mechanism and study the characterization of incentive compatible trust mechanisms so that more incentive compatible trust mechanisms can be constructed and incorporated into existing trust models to guarantee truthful recommendations.Simulation results show that our mechanism is effective in preventing strategic manipulation and guarantee that selfish users will give honest recommendations.
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