A Strategy of Reaction: The Armadas of 1596 and 1597 and the Spanish Struggle for European Hegemony

Abstract

The 1590s marked the turning point in the failure of Spain to attain European hegemony. Both Paul Kennedy and Geoffrey Parker have posited interesting theories on this subject but neither has conducted a detailed investigation of Spanish military strategy in the 1590s. This article examines the conflict at a crucial moment (1595), when Spain attempted to implement a new comprehensive grand strategy to coordinate its wars against the English, French, and Dutch. The linchpin for this strategy involved the dispatch of another Spanish Armada against England. My article examines the reasons for the collapse of this grand strategy, and tests the theories of both Kennedy and Parker to see if their explanations hold the key to understanding the Spanish failure. My investigation of the Armadas of 1596 and 1597 reveals that the failure was due, not so much to ideological or economic explanations, as they have posited, but to the absence of a coherent military strategy. Instead, Philip II substituted a “reactive” strategy, which responded to both real and imaginary threats, and that ultimately squandered Spanish resources, preventing him from taking advantage of certain favorable developments that might have altered the course of the war.