A Story of Interfaces at the Intersection Between Mithology and Antitrust: The European Commission v. Windows Server O.S.

Abstract

The present work focuses its analysis on the well known European Commission decision, dated 24th March 2004, against Microsoft. More precisely, as it is described in chapter 1, it deals only with the first allegation - the technological leveraging on the server OS market - and the related remedy imposed. The main structure of the work in question could be sketched as follows. The first part, chapter 2, gives an economic analysis of the contested conduct, opting for a system approach - in contrast with the distribution-chain one - and subdividing it into two perspective - the macro and the micro one - which will be then reunified for drawing a model of welfare analysis on the contested conduct and a sort of economic mantra for Antitrust Authorities when dealing with OS - Operative System - producers. In chapter 3, it is provided a systematic legal analysis of the Commission decision in assessing the violation of art. 82 ECT with respect to the contested conduct. The final outcome of this work is summarized in chapter 4. It shows that the Commission decision is inefficient due to a visible lack. Indeed the Commission did not reach the economic standard of proof needed to apply art. 82 ECT in the case in point. Thus, a part from the economic theory selected, this type of error - punishment without sufficient proofs - causing, with high probability, an irrational reaction by Microsoft's rational behaviour and - given the decision snow ball effect - causing an irrational change within all the European - and non- hi-tech firms' strategies will surely result in a true market distortion and connected loss of efficiency.