A Stealth Program Injection Attack against S7-300 PLCs

Abstract

Industrial control systems (ICSs) consist of programmable logic controllers (PLCs) which communicate with an engineering station on one side, and control a certain physical process on the other side. Siemens PLCs, particularly S7-300 controllers, are widely used in industrial systems, and modern critical infrastructures heavily rely on them. But unfortunately, security features are largely absent in such devices or ignored/disabled because security is often at odds with operations. As a consequence of the already reported vulnerabilities, it is possible to leverage PLCs and perhaps even the corporate IT network. In this paper we show that S7-300 PLCs are vulnerable and demonstrate that exploiting the execution process of the logic program running in a PLC is feasible. We discuss a replay attack that compromises the password protected PLCs, then we show how to retrieve the Bytecode from the target and decompile the Bytecode to STL source code. Afterwards we present how to conduct a typical injection attack showing that even a very tiny modification in the code is sufficient to harm the target system. Finally we combine the replay attack with the injection approach to achieve a stronger attack – the stealth program injection attack – which can hide the previous modification by engaging a fake PLC, impersonating the real infected device. For real scenarios, we implemented all our attacks on a real industrial setting using S7-300 PLC. We eventually suggest mitigation approaches to secure systems against such threats.