A Statistical Analysis of Palestinian Terrorism and Israeli Counter-Terrorism Over Time

Abstract

There has been much controversy and confusion over the issue of the proper response to domestic and international terrorism. Some believe that the best results can be achieved by harsh policies based on the so-called war model, which defines the fight against terrorism as a form of warfare. Paul Johnson, for example, suggests that the West should perfect a military instrument of fearful retribution to be used against terrorism! Benjamin Netanyahu argues that ... works on terrorists just as it does on anyone else.2 Counter-terrorism, therefore, assumes a military tone, with preemptive strikes and retaliations to destroy terrorist infrastructure and capabilities and to deter further acts of terror by raising the cost and risk involved in such acts. This philosophy is consistent with theories of resource mobilization, which assume that terrorist groups are rational actors and predicts deterrence policies work? Others believe that the is the best response to terrorism. Proponents of the communication model see terrorism as a last resort tactic used by weak and alienated groups who have been excluded from the political process. Therefore, counter-terrorism is viewed as a process of providing channels of communication and negotiations, which alleviate the necessity of using violent means. The advocates of this model condemn the use of force and claim that retaliations, preemptive strikes, and other types of force are acts of revenge that are mainly intended to satisfy the attackers. Jerrold Post argues that a policy of reactive retaliatory response will, in some circumstances, be counterproductive and encourage the very activity it is designed to deter.' This philosophy predicts that deterrence policies do not work because retaliation, reprisals, and repression will further alienate the dissidents, who then strike back at the regime. The existing theories cannot explain why in some conflicts the use of force by a government was successful and in others it was not. Although we currently do not know why government coercion produces mixed effects on popular strife,6 governments, after 1972, are increasingly responding with force to embassy seizures, hostage-taking incidents and retaliatory actions? Some examples are the rescue operation by the British anti-terrorist unit, SAS, on the Iranian embassy in London on April 30,1980;8 the simultaneous assaults on a hijacked train and a barricaded school by the Dutch anti-terrorist unit on March 23, 1977? the rescue operation by the French anti-terrorist unit, GIGN, on a school bus in Djibouti on February 3, 1976; the attempted rescue of hostages from the U.S. Embassy by the American Delta Force in 1980; and the air raid on Libya in 1985. 4