A Stackelberg Game-based planning approach for integrated community energy system considering multiple participants

Abstract

The game relationship between the Energy Server (ES) and the Energy Consumer (EC) in the Integrated Community Energy System (ICES) can change the energy supply and consumption behaviors of both participants, and affect the economy of the ICES planning scheme. This paper proposes a bi-level model to address a joint master-slave planning-operation problem of the ICES. Firstly, the revenue models of the ES and EC in the ICES is established. Secondly, a bi-level planning model based on Stackelberg Game for the ICES is proposed. In the upper level, a joint optimal planning model of energy conversion devices and energy prices is built and used by the ES (game leader) to maximize its profit. In the lower level, an optimal energy consuming strategy is proposed for the EC (game follower) to minimize its energy bill. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are utilized to convert the bi-level planning problem to a single-level mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). A typical ICES is employed as a test system to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed bi-level planning approach, and the results show that the proposed approach can reduce the investment cost of ES while ensuring the interests of EC.