Abstract
As a key technology of intelligent transportation systems (ITS), vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have been promising to provide safety and infotainment for drivers and passengers. To support different applications about traffic safety, traffic efficiency, autonomous driving and entertainment, it is important to investigate how to effectively deliver content in VANETs. Since it takes resources such as bandwidth and power for base stations (BSs) or roadside units (RSUs) to deliver content, the optimal pricing strategy for BSs and the optimal caching incentive scheme for RSUs need to be studied. In this paper, a framework of content delivery is proposed first, where each moving vehicle can obtain small-volume content files from either the nearest BS or the nearest RSU according to the competition among them. Then, the profit models for both BSs and RSUs are established based on stochastic geometry and point processes theory. Next, a caching incentive scheme for RSUs based on Stackelberg game is proposed, where both competition sides (i.e., BSs and RSUs) can maximize their own profits. Besides, a backward introduction method is introduced to solve the Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, the simulation results demonstrate that BSs can obtain their own optimal pricing strategy for maximizing the profit as well as RSUs can obtain the optimal caching scheme with the maximum profit during the content delivery.
Highlights
In recent years, as a key technology of intelligent transportation systems (ITS), vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have caught much attention because of the enormous potential in improving road safety and traffic efficiency as well as in providing drivers and passengers with infotainment services [1,2]
We propose a Stackelberg game-based caching incentive scheme for the roadside units (RSUs) in VANETs
In order to calculate the coverage probability of the heterogeneous network consisting of base stations (BSs) with mean λ, i.e., the probability density function of r is and RSUs, the coverage probability of the VANET consisting of RSUs need to be derived
Summary
As a key technology of intelligent transportation systems (ITS), vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have caught much attention because of the enormous potential in improving road safety and traffic efficiency as well as in providing drivers and passengers with infotainment services [1,2]. The ideal channel is assumed and the timeliness of content is ignored, while in [8], a pricing model for content delivery is proposed based on a Stackelberg game, where the RSU and parked vehicles compete for moving vehicles to obtain the profits. It has high complexity and the timeliness of content is ignored. A game model based on [27] is proposed to describe the interactions between different players (i.e., BSs and RSUs) to obtain the optimal pricing strategy of BSs and the optimal caching scheme of RSUs. Besides, the scheme involving the vehicles selecting which operator to serve is investigated.
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