Abstract

ABSTRACT In October 1983 the small Eastern Caribbean island of Grenada, a member of the Commonwealth with the Queen as Head of State, dominated the headlines in Britain. The US had invaded Grenada to restore order after the violent implosion of the Marxist-Leninist government. It is well established that the US misled the UK as to their intentions until the eleventh hour and that this resulted in a disproportionate amount of discord between the allies. This article departs from that aspect by examining how policymakers in London handled the crisis. Using recently declassified documents and interviews with participants, it demonstrates firstly that the British High Commission in Barbados read the signs of military action correctly but were side-lined by London after the request for assistance was received from the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States. Secondly, it reveals that the idea of taking the initiative and consulting with Washington after the murder of Grenada’s Prime Minister never arose and that government claims that they communicated their opposition to a military solution from the start were wrong as this only happened on the afternoon before the invasion.

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