A social-psychological perspective on tacit coordination: How it works, when it works, (and when it does not)

Abstract

We present a programmatic line of experimental studies which focus on the how and when of tacit coordination (i.e., the phenomenon that people can successfully coordinate their decisions without communication). We investigated this phenomenon using different types of economic games (i.e., social dilemmas as well as coordination games). Our studies broadly cover three themes: (a) fairness as a coordination rule, (b) uncertainty and common understanding, (c) social information as a cue. By focusing on these themes we have obtained several new insights on the prerequisites and boundary conditions of tacit coordination. We conclude that tacit coordination is often facilitated by mutual adherence to social norms (e.g., fairness rules, rules of deference, etcetera), but that in order to employ such norms people need sufficient environmental and/or social information.