Abstract
In this paper, we propose and test a model examining whether two different types of issues paramount in the contract negotiations, limitations of liability and quality or service quarantees, results in the differential involvement of attorneys vs. senior executives in the negotiations, with resulting differences in the objectives pursued (economic vs. relational) and outcomes achieved. Surveys were collected from 524 negotiators for primarily Fortune 500 companies. The supportive findings illustrate the important role played by the decision to involve different types of individuals in negotiations, particularly attorneys. When attorneys are involved, the negotiations tend to become more a quid pro quo exchange and based less on social exchange. While both types of exchanges can lead negotiators to experience satisfaction with the negotiation, they tend to be associated with different outcomes (power in the case of economic exchanges and increased collaboration in the case relational negotiations).
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