Abstract
An agent-based simulation study is reported to analyse an inter-group conflict in which agents contribute to provide a public good to all of them, and at the same time the different groups compete for an external prize. This mechanism encourages the group members to contribute instead of free riding. A dynamic version of this multi-player game is analysed in which each player is able to increase their contributed amount depending on the condition that the additional contribution improves her payoff or not. We will examine the dependence of the total contribution on the external prize and the timing of the additional contributions.
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