Abstract
Given a communication system using quantum key distribution (QKD), the receiver can be seen as one who tries to guess the sender’s information just as potential eavesdroppers do. The receiver-eavesdropper similarity thus implies a simple relation in terms of guessing probability and correctness of sifted keys, related with the distance-based, information-theoretic security. The tolerable regions of error rates determined by such a guessing-probability-based relation are shown to be close to those determined by security criteria. Thus, an alternative perspective on applying guessing probability in analyzing QKD issues is here provided. Examples of two specific protocols are illustrated. Our results contribute to evaluating an important element in communication study, and may provide useful reference for the security analysis of QKD protocols.
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