A SIMPLE MODEL OF OPTIMAL HATE CRIME LEGISLATION

Optimal Conservation Effort for a Population in a Stochastic Environment

In the Internet era, consumers prefer products with the attributes of social responsibility. Supply chain enterprises strengthen corporate social responsibility (CSR) management for their own development. To improve CSR throughout the supply chain, it requires coordination and cooperation among the members of the supply chain. In this paper, we consider a three-tier supply chain system consisting of a supplier, a manufacturer, and a retailer and use stochastic differential game to study the CSR coordination of the supply chain. The following indicators are investigated under four decision situations, such as the optimal level of CSR effort for the supply chain members, the optimal value of profit for the supply chain members and the supply chain system, and the expectation and variance of CSR goodwill. Some important results are obtained. (i) Compared with decentralized decision-making, the optimal level of CSR effort increases for the supplier and the manufacturer under local alliance decision-making without cost sharing, whereas the optimal level of CSR effort remains unchanged for the retailer. (ii) Compared with local alliance decision-making without cost sharing, the optimal level of CSR effort remains unchanged for the supplier and the manufacturer under local alliance decision-making with cost sharing. When the sum of the marginal profit for the supplier and the manufacturer is greater than half of the marginal profit for the retailer, the optimal level of CSR effort increases for the retailer. (iii) Compared with local alliance decision-making with cost sharing, the optimal level of CSR effort increases for the supply chain members under overall alliance decision-making. (iv) From decentralized decision-making to local alliance decision-making without cost sharing, to local alliance decision-making with cost sharing, and then to overall alliance decision-making, the optimal value of profit increases for the supply chain members and the supply chain system. Also, the expectation and variance of CSR goodwill increase.

We present a simple model of the effects of hate crime legislation. It shows that even if the direct harm to victims of hate crime is the same as for other crimes, because of other differences in the effects it may still be optimal to exert more law-enforcement effort to deter or prevent hate crime. These differences also have previously unrecognized effects on the optimal level of effort by potential hate crime victims to avoid being victimized, thus affecting the efficiency of government policies that encourage or discourage such effort. We discuss the implications of these results for optimal hate-crime policy, as well as for policy toward other similar crimes, such as terrorism.

Hate crimes (or bias crimes) are crimes motivated by an offenders’ personal bias against a particular social group. Modern hate crimes legislation developed out of civil rights protections based on race, religion, and national origin; however, the acts that constitute a hate crime have expanded over time, as have the groups protected by hate crimes legislation. Anti-LGBT hate crimes, in which victims are targeted based on their sexual orientation or gender identity. LGBT people are highly overrepresented as victims of hate crimes given the number of LGBT people in the population, and this is especially true of hate crimes against transgender women. Despite the frequency of these crimes, the legal framework for addressing them varies widely across the United States. Many states do not have specific legislation that addresses anti-LGBT hate crimes, while others have legislation that mandates data collection on those crimes but does not enhance civil or criminal penalties for them, and some offer enhanced civil and/or criminal penalties. Even in states that do have legislation to address these types of hate crimes, some states only address hate crimes based on sexual orientation but not those based on gender identity. The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act gives the federal government the authority to prosecute those crimes regardless of jurisdiction; however, this power has been used in a limited capacity. Hate crimes are distinct from other crimes that are not motivated by bias. For example, thrill seeking, retaliation, or the desire to harm or punish members of a particular social group often motivates perpetrators of hate crimes; these motivations often result in hate crimes being more violent than other similar crimes. The difference in the motivation of offenders also has significant consequences for victims, both physically and mentally. Victims of hate crimes are more likely to require medical attention than victims of non-bias crimes. Likewise, victims of hate crimes, and especially anti-LGBT hate crimes, often experience negative psychological outcomes, such as PTSD, depression, or anxiety as a result of being victimized for being a member of an already marginalized social group.

Tournament incentive mechanisms based on fairness preference in large-scale water diversion projects

Research on digital transformation strategy of the energy industry based on differential game under the dual-carbon background in China

This paper explores the issue of optimal valuation of retailer equity financing based on gambling agreements in a centralized supply chain. Firstly, the betting target settings are classified into three cases: high, medium, and low. Secondly, the optimal valuation models for retailer equity financing in a centralized supply chain without and with introducing a gambling agreement are constructed separately. Finally, this paper clarifies the relationships among factors such as the betting transfer share ratio, ordering price, and optimal valuation level through simulation analysis. The results illustrate the following: (i) There is always an only optimal valuation level and optimal effort level that makes the retailer and supplier might reach an equity financing agreement. (ii) When the betting target is set too high, the betting transfer share ratio varies in the same direction as the optimal valuation level and the opposite direction as the optimal effort level. (iii) When the betting target is set moderately or too low, the betting transfer share ratio has an inverse relationship with the optimal valuation level. However, the retailer will increase its effort level at this time. (iv) In addition, the optimal valuation level is affected by the retailer’s firm growth and ordering price.

PurposeConstruction projects have become increasingly long, complex and costly with waste and inefficiencies and often fail to achieve the desired results. Integrated project delivery (IPD) is believed to change these problems. A reasonable and fair profit distribution mechanism is a critical factor for ensuring the success of the IPD projects. This study aims to investigate the strategies of all participants in the profit distribution of an IPD project with respect to the factor of the effort level.Design/methodology/approachThis study describes the influence of owners and participants on profit distribution due to their respective efforts in the IPD project alliance. The influence of effort level on profit distribution is discussed based on the Holmstrom-Milgrom model of asymmetric information game theory and principal-agent theory, combined with incentive compatibility (IC) constraints and individual rationality (IR) constraints.FindingsThe results show that the optimal level of effort by each participant optimizes the profit distribution of an IPD project. At the same time, in the revenue incentive contract, the effort level of the participants is positively correlated with the profit distribution, proportional to their contribution coefficient and inversely proportional to the square of the cost of their creative activities in terms of effort. Each party of an IPD project can adopt a series of measures to improve their own effort level and choose the optimal level of effort based on the profit distribution, while satisfying their own utility maximization.Originality/valueThis study introduces the Holmstrom-Milgrom model in the principal-agent theory to explore the influence of the effort level on profit distribution in IPD projects. The quantitative model can contribute to establish a fair and efficient profit distribution scheme for the IPD projects.

With the development of Chinese overseas direct investment (ODI) in green ports, a series of conflicts and contradictions among the participating parties have emerged, which in turn affect and hinder the process of project construction. This paper analyzes the current situation of Chinese ODI in green ports, constructs a cooperative game model between Chinese port investment enterprises and the host government with introduces the effort level, and selects three actual green port projects for calculation and analysis to show that Chinese ODI in green ports can bring economic and environmental benefits to both parties. It is found that the expected revenues and effort levels of both the Chinese port enterprises and the host government are positively correlated with each other’s effort levels, and there exists an optimal effort level and an optimal investment amount of the Chinese port enterprises to maximize the benefits obtained by both parties in the green port project. At the same time, the cases studied find that the benefits obtained by the host government are higher; Therefore, Chinese port investment enterprises can promote green ports projects by finding their own optimal effort level. Additionally, active cooperation is the optimal choice of the host government.

Optimal decisions in a dual-channel competitive green supply chain management under promotional effort

Much of the academic, practitioner and voluntary sector interest in victims of hate crime have focused upon the impacts of hate crime and the practical and emotional support needs and services for victims. Our own work has been somewhat divergent from this. We were commissioned to identify how hate crime reporting could be improved in a northern town, and made inclusive across different equality groups. We undertook a small scale study that examined individual decision making by hate crime victims in whether or not to report incidents, and how the available reporting arrangements and associated publicity materials affected these decisions (Wong & Christmann, 2008). Somewhat to our surprise, what appeared to be a critical issue in terms of whether or not hate crime policies were likely to succeed was also a much under researched area. Whilst our own research findings cannot be generalised beyond the study site, it did allow us to test out and consider more thoroughly some of the assumptions implicit in policy developments around hate crime reporting, specifically the policy goal of full reporting. We want to reflect back on these findings and the broader research literature to pose some questions on the adequacy and utility of the current reporting agencies approaches and the general policy direction to hate crime victims. We believe this has merit because the statutory criminal justice agencies and the voluntary sector are grappling with the challenges of adopting hate crime in its broadest sense, and providing a responsive, effective and victim centred service across markedly different vulnerable groups. Pertinent questions can be asked about what the current policies on hate crime can be expected to achieve given the nature of victim decision making on the critical issue of whether to report their victimisation. We will draw out some implications that the legacy of the Lawrence Inquiry has had for strategic thinking, policy making and make some tentative suggestions on how these might be improved. We argue something that may be considered heresy among hate crime victimloogy circles and victim campaigning groups; that the current policy message concerning victim reporting does not reflect reality, and risks being discredited. What is required, some 10 years post Lawrence is more nuanced responses and ones which acknowledge: the distance travelled by criminal justice agencies in the intervening years; that the majority of hate crime is manifested as single incidents of harassment (which may not necessarily constitute crimes); and the unlikelihood of full reporting by the public, which realistically fits where the public are in terms of their expectations. In doing so we do not pretend to have any authoritative answers to these issues, but believe the questions are worth posing to prompt a debate between efficacy of response versus a largely unchallenged view of hate crime victimology.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a non-linear dynamic model for Bangladesh trawl shrimp fishery for optimal control in discrete-time frame. The model has been developed on the concept of optimal resource management based on the criterion of maximization of present values of net economic revenues. The results of the optimal steady state solutions (i.e. optimal stock, harvest and effort level) for ensuring long run sustainability of the resource through the model are presented. Results reveal that Bangladesh marine shrimp fishery is not managed and utilized optimally. Present condition of high effort level, less harvest amount and less shrimp stock indicates that the danger of depletion of the resource cannot be ruled out. Key words: Bangladesh marine shrimp fishery, optimal management, non-linear dynamic model. DOI = 10.3329/jard.v5i1.1471 J Agric Rural Dev 5(1&2), 143-149, June 2007

Accounting for continuous species' responses to management effort enhances cost-effectiveness of conservation decisions

In a 1976 Journal paper Griffin, Lacewell, and Nichols (GLN) present a discussion of optimal utilization of fisheries which directly considers the share system of remuneration and the possibility that some costs are related to the catch size. They present two main conclusions. First, adherence to the traditional fisheries model will lead to incorrect policy recommendations if its assumptions do not hold. Second, with a fixed-share system, if the fishery is operating at less than the open access equilibrium level of effort, the earned rents will be distributed between vessel owners and crew members. In the traditional model, where labor is assumed to receive an opportunity cost wage rate, any accrued rents will go only to vessel owners. The conclusion that rents can be earned by crew members has important distribution and efficiency implications and is a contribution to literature on fisheries economics. However, the article contains the three errors which weaken its impact and could lead to an improper interpretation of these implications. (a) The equation derived for optimal fishery utilization erroneously indicates that the optimal level of effort depends upon the share rate chosen. (b) In the empirical estimates section, they correct for the above error but introduce another by allowing a transfer payment to be included as an opportunity cost measure. (c) They incorrectly conclude that, to achieve an optimal level of effort using a tax system, both vessel owners and crew members have to be taxed. In addition, there is a general misconception in the paper captured in the following quote from the abstract. When crews receive a fixed share of gross returns, labor costs are proportional to catch ... This is only true for pecuniary or financial costs. In their model the opportunity cost of labor is not affected by the way revenues and/or cash costs are shared. The first two of their errors are related to this confusion between financial and opportunity cost.

Are Embedded Validity Indices Equivalent to Free-Standing Symptom Validity Tests?