Abstract
We introduce a novel framework for analyzing coalition formation, applied to climate cooperation. Our model allows for multiple rounds of negotiations and is able to explain the formation of large coalitions. The incentive of each coalition member to join and subsequently to sign a long-term contract is to prevent inefficient delay that arises as soon as a single country deviates. This undermines the free-rider incentive that destabilizes large coalitions in static coalition formation games. The equilibrium coalition size is then determined by a “threshold effect” due to which deviations of coalition members become unprofitable for sufficiently large coalitions.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
